Against Conduct-Based Immunity for Torture Victim Protection Act Defendants by Luke Ryan
Barry Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 1
2-19-2018
Against Conduct-Based Immunity for Torture
Victim Protection Act Defendants
Luke Ryan
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Barry Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.
Recommended Citation
Luke Ryan (2018) "Against Conduct-Based Immunity for Torture Victim Protection Act Defendants," Barry Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss.
1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol23/iss1/1
1 
AGAINST CONDUCT-BASED IMMUNITY FOR TORTURE VICTIM 
PROTECTION ACT DEFENDANTS 
Luke Ryan* 
On October 13, 2016, former Israeli Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak, was 
granted immunity and dismissed from a civil action alleging he violated the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) by authorizing the torture and extrajudicial 
killing of an American citizen.1 Both the government of Israel and the United States 
Department of State called on the court to grant federal common law foreign official 
immunity by arguing that Barak was protected from suit because he acted “in his 
official capacity.”2 The TVPA, however, permits legal action against foreign 
defendants who have acted in such a capacity—namely, “under actual or apparent 
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”3 Nevertheless, the court 
determined that the TVPA did not abrogate federal common law immunity “where 
the sovereign state officially acknowledges and embraces the official’s acts,” 
allowing the court to also avoid the complicated question of whether the executive 
branch has the power to order a court to grant immunity.4 
This article argues that the text and legislative history of the TVPA prohibit 
federal common law conduct-based immunity. First, the mere assertion that a TVPA 
defendant acted “in his official capacity” is not sufficient to dismiss allegations of 
torture or extrajudicial killing because the TVPA requires such capacity as a 
prerequisite to liability. Second, the Act’s legislative history, which directs federal 
courts to look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for guidance regarding the immunities 
available to TVPA defendants, demonstrates Congress’ intent to allow government 
officials to be held personally liable for acts undertaken in an official capacity—
regardless of a foreign state’s acknowledgment or embracement.5 Finally, while 
federal courts have an interest in avoiding conflict with the executive branch in cases 
involving foreign affairs, the executive branch lacks the power to mandate conduct-
 ________________________  
 * J.D., 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2002, University of Virginia. Special thanks to 
Professor Thomas H. Lee and Tess M. Sadler for their guidance and encouragement and the Barry Law Review for 
their invaluable support. 
 1. See Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016). 
 2. Suggestion of Immunity by the United States, Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-CV-08130 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 10, 
2016), ECF No. 48 [hereinafter Dogan Suggestion of Immunity]; Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12. 
 3. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 note (2012)) [hereinafter TVPA]. 
 4. Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12. 
 5. “Courts should look to principles of liability under U.S. civil rights laws, in particular section 1983 of 
title 42 of the United States Code, in construing ‘under color of law’ . . . .” S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991) 
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Similarly, the House Report states that “[c]ourts should look to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 
is [sic] construing ‘color of law’ . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87 
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT, with page numbers as original]. 
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based foreign official immunity—especially when, as here, the executive branch 
asserts an incorrect interpretation of federal law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the landmark 2010 decision Samantar v. Yousuf,6 the Supreme Court of the 
United States unanimously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA)7 does not provide foreign government officials with immunity in U.S. 
courts.8 Instead, the Court declared that foreign individuals may be granted immunity 
under federal common law but did not establish a framework for the doctrine, 
remanding that question to the lower court.9 In the years since Samantar, legal 
scholars have debated the circumstances in which federal common law foreign 
official immunity applies, and the federal courts have struggled to adopt a uniform 
standard.10 
Foreign official immunity determinations raise complicated questions of 
international and domestic law that are compounded by competing priorities of the 
executive and judicial branches.11 On the one hand, foreign official immunity 
implicates the power of the executive branch over foreign affairs.12 On the other 
 ________________________  
 6. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012)) [hereinafter FSIA]. 
 8. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325. 
 9. Id. at 325–26. 
 10. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government 
Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141 (2011) (arguing in favor of executive branch control over foreign 
official immunity determinations); Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The 
Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011) (arguing against executive control). 
 11. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of Foreign Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
704, 704 (2012) [hereinafter Keitner, The Forgotten History] (discussing the overlapping and competing interests 
involved in decisions to grant or deny domestic immunity to foreign government officials). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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hand, such determinations directly involve the judiciary’s exclusive authority to 
apply U.S. law and resolve disputes.13 Not surprisingly, determining whether a 
foreign government official is protected from liability in a civil action brought in a 
U.S. court has resulted in an open conflict between the two branches.14 While the 
U.S. Department of State has declared that its recommendations of immunity are 
dispositive,15 some courts have rejected such mandatory deference.16 
This tug-of-war between the executive and judicial branches has already resulted 
in a circuit split17 over the question of whether foreign official immunity is ever 
appropriate in civil actions alleging the official has violated internationally accepted 
norms known as jus cogens.18 While jus cogens liability arises from customary 
international law and deference to the views of the executive branch in the exercise 
of its power over foreign affairs may indeed be appropriate in that context,19 the 
executive branch has also asserted absolute control over foreign official immunity in 
cases alleging torture or extrajudicial killing20—jus cogens-like violations that are 
statutorily prohibited by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).21 
On June 10, 2016, the State Department intervened in the Central District of 
California case Dogan v. Barak,22 essentially ordering the United States District 
Court to grant immunity to former Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak.23 The 
executive branch’s “Suggestion of Immunity” was made at the request of the State 
of Israel in a civil action alleging Barak had authorized the torture and extrajudicial 
killing of an American citizen.24 Both the government of Israel and the executive 
branch supported dismissal based on Barak’s declaration that he was entitled to 
federal common law foreign official immunity because the allegations against him 
 ________________________  
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 14. Tension between the executive and judicial branches over the conduct of foreign affairs is nothing new. 
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 662 (1981) (discussing executive orders as “only one more 
episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents 
each day some new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live and which no 
one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances”). 
 15. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Samantar v. Yousuf, 135 S. Ct. 1528 (2015) (No. 
13-1361), 2015 WL 412283, at *18 [hereinafter Samantar Brief for the United States]; Dogan Suggestion of 
Immunity, supra note 2, at 1–2. See also infra Part V. 
 16. See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 2016); Transcript of Motion to Dismiss Proceedings 
at 3, Dogan v. Barak, No. 15-CV-08130 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2016), ECF No. 53. See also infra Part V. 
 17. Compare Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The State Department’s 
determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by contrast, is not controlling” and “officials from other countries 
are not entitled to foreign official immunity for [international law] violations.”), with Rosenberg v. Pasha, No. 13-
4334-CV, 2014 WL 4211057, at *23 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 2014) (“‘[I]n the common-law context, we defer to the 
Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity’ and [] ‘[a] claim premised on the violation of [international 
law] does not withstand foreign [official] immunity.’” (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
 18. Jus cogens norms are “norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332; see also Saleh v. Bush, 848 F.3d 880, 892 (9th Cir. 2017); Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 
1279, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 19. See, e.g., Pasha, 2014 WL 4211057, at *23. 
 20. See Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 2, at 8; see also infra Part V. 
 21. TVPA, supra note 3. 
 22. Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 2, at 1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
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were based on acts he had undertaken “in his official capacity.”25 The plaintiff’s 
claims, however, were brought under the TVPA, which fundamentally and explicitly 
requires that the defendant be an individual who acted “under actual or apparent 
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation”26—namely, a foreign government 
official who acted in an official or apparently official capacity. Nevertheless, four 
months after the State Department intervened, the district court granted Barak’s 
motion to dismiss, granting him immunity by holding that federal common law 
entitles a TVPA defendant to immunity “where the sovereign state officially 
acknowledges and embraces the official’s acts.”27 
This article examines the federal common law of foreign official immunity in 
cases arising under the TVPA and argues that the Act’s text and legislative history 
required a different outcome. The mere assertion that Barak acted in his official 
capacity was not sufficient to dismiss the plaintiff’s TVPA claims. First, simply 
admitting that the defendant acted in an “official capacity”—as both the State of 
Israel and the U.S. State Department declared, without anything more—was not 
“acknowledge[ment] and embrace[ment]” of the torture and extrajudicial killing 
sufficient to implicate Israel as a required party so that FSIA sovereign immunity 
would permit dismissal.28 Second, “official capacity” does not provide sufficient 
grounds to justify federal common law immunity against claims of torture or 
extrajudicial killing because the legislative history of the TVPA, which analogizes 
the immunities available to TVPA defendants to the immunities available to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 defendants, permits holding government officials personally liable 
when they act in an official capacity.29 When the Ninth Circuit decides the Dogan 
appeal later this year, it should reverse Barak’s dismissal because a TVPA defendant 
is not entitled to conduct-based protection where the TVPA defendant is sued in his 
personal capacity for money damages to be paid from the defendant’s own pockets.30 
Part I of this article outlines the federal common law of foreign official immunity 
and discusses how conduct-based immunity functions. Part II delves into the 
TVPA’s text and legislative history to examine the immunities Congress intended 
for foreign government officials sued under the Act. Part III discusses immunities 
 ________________________  
 25. Letter from Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Jun. 10, 2016) (attached as Exhibit 1 to Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, 
supra note 2); State of Israel Diplomatic Note (Dec. 31, 2015) (attached as Exhibit H to Dec’l of Christopher M. 
Egleson in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dogan v. Barak, No. 15-CV-08130 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2016), 
ECF No. 26). 
 26. TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 27. Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12. 
 28. The Supreme Court has suggested that Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Required Joinder 
of Parties) could provide grounds for dismissal of an action against a foreign official “where the sovereign state 
officially acknowledges and embraces the official’s acts.” Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12; see Samantar v. 
Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324–25 (2010) (discussing the inability to join an immune foreign sovereign as potential 
grounds to dismiss under required party joinder); see also infra Part V. The TVPA, however, provides an express 
federal cause of action against individuals independent of any claim or required joinder of a foreign sovereign. See 
infra Part II. Moreover, Israel did not take responsibility for—i.e. truly acknowledge and embrace—the alleged 
torture and extrajudicial killing. See State of Israel Diplomatic Note, supra note 25. Indeed, the Dogan court did not 
address or support its dismissal on the grounds of failure to join a required party. Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12; 
see also infra Part V. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
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available to government officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—immunities that 
Congress instructed courts to look to when evaluating immunity in TVPA actions. 
Part IV demonstrates that the TVPA does not allow foreign officials (such as Barak) 
to be granted conduct-based immunity against allegations of torture or extrajudicial 
killing. Finally, Part V examines and rejects the executive branch’s declaration of 
authority to intervene in a lawsuit and unilaterally grant conduct-based immunity. 
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
Defendants haled into federal court are not treated equally. This part provides a 
foundation for examining Dogan v. Barak31 by discussing the federal common law 
of foreign official immunity in civil actions alleging torture or extrajudicial killing. 
As the Dogan court correctly determined,32 federal common law provides some 
TVPA defendants with protection from suit in U.S. courts.33 The court, however, 
erred in granting a certain type of protection, conduct-based foreign official 
immunity, because TVPA defendants cannot be shielded from liability based on the 
official nature of their allegedly tortious acts.34 As a result, the Israeli government’s 
generic assertion that Barak acted “in an official capacity” is not sufficient to justify 
immunity, and granting Barak’s motion to dismiss improperly deprived the Dogan 
plaintiffs of their day in court. 
Foreign sovereigns—the actual foreign states—are entitled to immunity in U.S. 
courts under a federal statute (the FSIA),35 federal common law (the act of state 
doctrine),36 and customary international law.37 In contrast, foreign individuals—
natural persons—are only entitled to immunity under federal common law.38 
Individual immunity is commonly called “foreign official immunity” because the 
more limited protections available to natural persons are an extension of the broader 
and more generalized immunities available to foreign sovereigns.39 Lastly, foreign 
 ________________________  
 31. Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, *1. 
 32. See id. at *11. 
 33. Id.; see also infra Part II. C (discussing TVPA immunity for heads-of-state and diplomats). 
 34. The U.S. Department of State also incorrectly determined that federal common law conduct-based 
immunity was available to defendant Barak. Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 2, at 2; see also infra Part 
V. 
 35. FSIA, supra note 7. 
 36. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (establishing the act of state doctrine); 
see also Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official 
Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 258 (2010). 
 37. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Ingrid B. Wuerth, Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice 
Perspective, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 563, 581 (2016). 
 38. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010); see also Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of 
Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2675 (2011); Luke Ryan, Note, The New Tate Letter: 
Foreign Official Immunity and the Case for a Statutory Fix, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773, 1805–09 (2016) (proposing 
a new federal statute to codify the immunity of foreign officials). 
 39. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 38, at 2675 (“Foreign official immunity is a derivative of the immunity 
of the official’s state.”); see also In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[I]mmunity is a personal right. It derives 
from and remains an ‘attribute of state sovereignty.’” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108 (4th 
Cir. 1987))); Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 04-CV-01360 (LMB), ECF No. 147 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011), aff’d, Yousuf 
v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The immunity protecting foreign officials for their official acts 
ultimately belongs to the sovereign rather than the official.”). 
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official immunity is only available to an individual designated as an agent or official 
of a foreign state.40 
Federal common law protects foreign officials from the burdens of litigation 
with two forms of immunity: (1) immunity based on the individual’s status as a 
foreign sovereign’s head-of-state, diplomat, or consular official; and (2) immunity 
based on the official’s conduct that was performed on behalf of the foreign 
sovereign.41 Status-based immunity is only available to a narrow group of individuals 
who hold a specific position—but such immunity provides broad protection over all 
acts undertaken by that official while occupying the unique role.42 On the other hand, 
conduct-based immunity functions almost as the mirror opposite. Conduct-based 
immunity is broadly available to any foreign official—but is limited to providing 
protection over narrowly defined “sovereign acts” that can be imputed onto the 
sovereign itself.43 
Federal common law conduct-based foreign official immunity is a necessary 
extension of federal statutory and common law foreign sovereign immunity. Comity 
among nations and principles of international law provide foreign states with 
protection in the legal systems of other states for acts considered “public” or 
“sovereign.”44 Those sovereigns, however, can only perform that protected conduct 
through the actions of individuals.45 When foreign individuals engage in conduct that 
is essentially the conduct of the sovereign, the sovereign is the party responsible for 
any harm that results.46 Federal common law foreign official immunity exists to 
protect that sovereign’s official against personal liability for the acts undertaken in 
that official capacity.47 In the alternative, when foreign individuals engage in conduct 
that is not official—that is, not attributable to the sovereign—the individual is the 
party responsible for any harm that results.48 In this case, neither the sovereign nor 
the individual is entitled to immunity because the source of immunity—the need to 
protect a sovereign act—does not exist.49 
As Professor Chimène I. Keitner recently explained, conduct-based immunity 
can be understood—and the availability of conduct-based immunity determined—
through a framework that focuses on the type of act performed by the official: 
1) Acts attributable solely to the state and for which such attribution 
discharges the individual from personal responsibility, such as 
 ________________________  
 40. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 
837, 843 (2011) [hereinafter Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity]. 
 41. See VED P. NANDA ET AL., LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS at § 4:1 (2d ed. 
2017); Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 63 (2010) 
[hereinafter Keitner, The Common Law]. 
 42. See, e.g., Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774; NANDA ET AL., supra note 41, at § 4:2–4:5. 
 43. See, e.g., Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774; NANDA ET AL., supra note 41, at § 4:6–4:9. 
 44. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2602 (1997). 
 45. See Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials: Attribution and Responsibility in the Law 
of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 451, 453 (2016) [hereinafter Keitner, Categorizing 
Acts]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. at 454. 
 49. See id.  
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signing a treaty or entering into a commercial transaction on behalf 
of the state (“Category One”). 
2) Acts attributable to the state and for which such attribution does 
not discharge the individual from personal responsibility under 
domestic and/or international law, such as ordering torture 
(“Category Two”). 
3) Acts not attributable to the state and for which the individual 
bears sole responsibility, such as vandalizing a neighbor’s property 
without actual or apparent state authority (“Category Three”).50 
Under this category system, a key question when considering whether a foreign 
official may invoke conduct-based immunity is whether the plaintiff’s claims against 
the foreign official are attributable to the foreign state.51 Put another way, the 
question is: Who is responsible—the foreign official or the foreign sovereign?52 If 
the plaintiff’s claims are sovereign acts—that is, acts that may be imputed onto the 
sovereign—conduct-based immunity essentially substitutes the foreign sovereign for 
the foreign official as the defendant against whom the plaintiff’s case should have 
been brought because the foreign sovereign is the real party in interest.53 If the 
sovereign would be immune against the plaintiff’s claims (that were first brought 
against the official), the case is properly dismissed. 
Conduct-based foreign official immunity for Category One acts—which are 
attributable solely to the sovereign—is uncontroversial because Category One acts 
are essentially an exercise of the sovereign’s power and the sovereign takes full 
responsibility for the act and its consequences.54 Likewise, non-immunity for 
Category Three acts—which are acts performed by the foreign official without actual 
or implied authority, or acts involving conduct that cannot be attributed to the 
sovereign—is also uncontroversial because Category Three acts are an exercise of 
power the sovereign has not delegated to the individual.55 Category Three acts 
usually involve the sort of conduct the sovereign—which possesses the immunity 
the official seeks56—has declared to be illegal or non-condonable and, therefore, not 
an act worthy of protection.57 
The more challenging conduct-based immunity determinations involve Category 
Two acts, where responsibility for any resulting harm can be attributed to the 
sovereign, the individual, or both.58 Category Two acts—such as torture—are often 
 ________________________  
 50. Id. at 453–54. 
 51. See Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 453–54. 
 52. Id. at 456. 
 53. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (“[I]t may be the case that some actions against an official 
in his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in 
interest.”); see infra Part IV. See also supra note 28. 
 54. Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 456–57. 
 55. See id. at 456. 
 56. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 456. 
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a blend of Category One and Category Three because the nature of the act appears 
official, but the individual who performed it also appears to have some personal 
responsibility or appears to have acted beyond their scope of authority. In this case, 
the usual justification for granting immunity—that the official’s acts are sovereign 
acts—does not apply.59 Likewise, the usual justification for rejecting immunity—
that the official was acting outside the scope of his or her authority or in a personal, 
non-official capacity—also does not apply.60 
The challenge created by Category Two acts is not necessarily confined to 
international disputes involving foreign governments. The gray area between 
Category One and Category Three actions also occurs in domestic cases involving 
U.S. government officials.61 Fortunately, federal common law conduct-based 
immunities that apply in domestic cases lend valuable insight when considering 
conduct-based foreign official immunity and Category Two questions.62 Indeed, in 
both foreign and domestic contexts, “the characteristics that make an act attributable 
to the state for purposes of state responsibility are much broader than those that 
warrant shielding an individual alleged to have performed such an act from the 
exercise of foreign jurisdiction.”63 
While attribution is important to understanding the availability of conduct-based 
immunity, Professor Keitner also argues that “[a]ttribution cannot be the sole basis 
for determining whether or not a state official should be held personally responsible 
by a foreign court.”64 Professor Keitner’s concern is that by only focusing on whether 
the act (such as torture or extrajudicial killing) is attributable to the sovereign, courts 
will reflexively discharge foreign officials from personal responsibility without 
sufficiently investigating whether conduct-based immunity is even appropriate.65 
This appears to be what happened in Dogan.66 As soon as the court decided that 
the defendant’s acts were attributable to the sovereign (because Israel had 
“acknowledged and embraced” the conduct), the court granted conduct-based 
immunity.67 But even under a view of the immunity doctrine that relies on attribution 
as the sole basis for conduct-based immunity—the view that Professor Keitner 
warned against68 and the Dogan court appears to have adopted—the court’s decision 
was still improper because the TVPA prohibits attribution as grounds for 
immunity—the Act requires that the defendant have acted or appeared to have acted 
in some sort of official or non-personal capacity.69 By premising liability on official 
 ________________________  
 59. Id. at 458. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See infra Part III. 
 62. Congress has recognized the similarities between the foreign and domestic official immunity doctrines 
and has instructed courts to consider principles of domestic immunity when evaluating foreign immunity. See infra 
Part III. 
 63. Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 459. 
 64. Id. at 478. Professor Keitner criticizes “the position that, because accepted doctrines of foreign sovereign 
immunity [such as the act of state doctrine] shield foreign states themselves from legal consequences for certain 
Category Two acts [such as torture] in other countries’ domestic courts, foreign official immunity necessarily shields 
state officials from foreign legal proceedings for the same acts.” Id. at 458. 
 65. Id. at 478. 
 66. Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016). 
 67. Id. at *12. “Barak’s acts are irrefutably ‘official public acts’ that entitle him to immunity.” Id. at *9. 
 68. Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 458, 478. 
 69. See infra Part II. 
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capacity, the TVPA eliminates Category Two ambiguity and establishes express 
liability on the individual official for torture and extrajudicial killing regardless 
whether the official acted in a way attributable to the sovereign or with the 
sovereign’s consent, acknowledgement, or embracement. 
II. THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT 
On its face, the TVPA is clear and unambiguous, establishing a federal cause of 
action in a succinct seventy-one words: 
LIABILITY.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, 
or color of law, of any foreign nation— 
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable 
for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil 
action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, 
or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.70 
The text draws sharp boundaries on the types of lawsuits that may be brought. 
First, the use of “individual” establishes that only natural persons are liable under 
the Act.71 The TVPA does not apply to organizations such as sovereign states or their 
agencies or instrumentalities—entities that, at the time the TVPA was enacted, were 
entitled to immunity under the FSIA (even in civil actions alleging torture or 
extrajudicial killing).72 Second, the defendant must be acting under the law of a 
“foreign nation.”73 Liability does not extend to individuals acting under U.S. federal 
or state law.74 Third, the TVPA only creates liability in a “civil action”—that is, 
liability for money damages.75 As a result, the Act does not subject a defendant to 
criminal prosecution. Fourth, the TVPA only applies in cases involving at least one 
of two specific offenses (torture or extrajudicial killing) that are clearly defined in 
the Act.76 Finally, section 2(b) of the TVPA establishes U.S. courts as forums of last 
resort for allegations of torture or extrajudicial killing against a non-U.S. defendant 
 ________________________  
 70. TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 71. Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2012) (“[T]he text of the statute persuades us 
that the Act authorizes liability solely against natural persons.”); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 174 (2d 
Cir. 2014). 
 72. See FSIA, supra note 7; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (upholding 
the constitutionality of the FSIA and Congress’s power to codify foreign sovereign immunity). 
 73. TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (state officials) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) 
(federal officials) authorize civil actions against U.S. officials acting under color of U.S. federal or state law for 
torture or extrajudicial killing. 
 75. See TVPA, supra note 3. 
 76. See id. at § 3. 
9
: Against Conduct-Based Immunity
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017
10 Barry Law Review Vol. 23, No. 1 
by requiring plaintiffs to “exhaust[] adequate and available remedies in the place in 
which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”77 
On its face, the TVPA is remarkably simple: 485 words (including the 
preamble). That apparent simplicity creates problems, however, because the Act is 
silent regarding the affirmative defenses and immunities available to TVPA 
defendants.78 “In order to abrogate a common-law principle [such as foreign official 
immunity], the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the 
common law.”79 In general, federal courts will not look beyond a statute’s text,80 but 
when “the language of the statute does not alone resolve the issue, [courts] must look 
to the legislative history.”81 The overall structure and purpose of the statute, as well 
as its text and legislative history, are important to determining congressional intent 
and whether the statute “speaks directly” to the common law principle.82 
Notably, five crucial elements in the TVPA’s legislative history provide a 
compelling indication of congressional intent regarding a TVPA defendant’s scope 
of liability:83 (1) where the statute was included in the U.S. Code; (2) what Congress 
omitted from the legislative history; (3) the premising of liability to “any individual;” 
(4) the contrasting discussion of “status” and “conduct” as a basis for liability; and 
most importantly, (5) the instruction that courts should look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
when determining a TVPA defendant’s scope of liability. As the House and Senate 
reports reveal, Congress enacted the Act so that private-party plaintiffs could hold 
foreign officials personally liable for torture or extrajudicial killing—especially 
when those officials were acting in an official capacity or within their scope of 
authority.84 
A. Alien Tort Statute 
Congress associated the TVPA very closely with the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS)85—another remarkably short federal law that deals with civil actions in U.S. 
 ________________________  
 77. Id. at § 2(b). 
 78. See Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 
2016); Singh v. G.k., No. 1:15-CV-05372 (ALC), 2016 WL 3181149, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016). 
 79. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1665 (2012) 
(“[W]e ‘proceed[] on the assumption that common-law principles of . . . immunity were incorporated into our judicial 
system and that they should not be abrogated absent clear legislative intent to do so.’” (alterations and quotations 
omitted)). 
 80. See, e.g., Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (“[T]here is no need to refer to the legislative history 
where the statutory language is clear.”). 
 81. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 246 (1986); see also N. Haven Bd. 
of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 551 (1982); C.I.R. v. Bosch’s Estate, 387 U.S. 456, 463 (1967). 
 82. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992); see also Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 
371, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d and remanded, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (“In determining congressional intent, we 
focus of course on the language of the provision at issue, but we also consider the overall structure and purpose of 
the statute.”). 
 83. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5. 
 84. See infra Part IV; see also TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a) (stating defendants must be acting “under actual 
or apparent authority, or color of law”). 
 85. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, s 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
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courts involving foreign defendants.86 Similar to the TVPA, the ATS’s lack of 
specificity has resulted in confusion and changing interpretations of the ATS.87 
When the TVPA was enacted in 1991, Congress88 and the courts89 viewed the ATS 
in light of the Second Circuit’s landmark case, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.90 In Filartiga, 
the Second Circuit adopted a broad reading of the ATS, holding that non-U.S. citizen 
plaintiffs were allowed to bring civil actions in U.S. courts against foreign 
government officials for alleged torture or other violations of customary 
international law that were committed outside the United States.91 The House and 
Senate reports establish the TVPA as an extension of the ATS by explaining that the 
TVPA’s purpose was to clarify confusion about the ATS recently raised in a District 
of Columbia Circuit case92 and add to Filartiga by providing “a clear and specific 
remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and extrajudicial killing.”93 
Congress’s discussion of the ATS clarifies congressional intent regarding the 
liability of foreign officials under the TVPA because, when the TVPA was enacted 
in 1991, the ATS permitted federal court jurisdiction over civil actions against 
foreign officials for torture or summary execution.94 When Congress enacted the 
TVPA, codified it in the same section of the U.S. Code, and expressed support for 
Filartiga, the ATS—and now the TVPA—expressly allowed foreign officials to be 
held personally liable for two specific torts that were committed outside the United 
States—even though the foreign sovereign itself was immune.95 
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The second indication that Congress intended foreign officials to bear personal 
liability for acts of torture or extrajudicial killing is contained in the House and 
 ________________________  
 86. The TVPA and ATS are codified in the same part of the U.S. Code. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (ATS); 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012) (TVPA). 
 87. See generally Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the 
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645 (2014) (providing a full discussion of the ATS). 
 88. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4. 
 89. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (“The position we take today has been assumed 
by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Peña-Irala . . . .”); Forti v. 
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539–40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (following Filartiga and holding the ATS grants a 
cause of action against officials for violations of international law).  
 90. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 91. Id. at 885–86. 
 92. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). In response to concerns raised in Tel-Oren, the House Report declared that the TVPA 
would create an “explicit” and “contemporary” “grant by Congress of a private right of action” allowing U.S. courts 
to “consider cases likely to impact [] U.S. foreign relations.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4; see also SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 94. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (“The TVPA would establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of 
action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law . . . .” (referring to the ATS)). See Lee, supra 
note 87, at 1665. 
 95. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5, 7–9; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–5. See Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 867, 889–90 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908) (holding a state official 
could be subject to suit for constitutional violations despite the immunity of the state)); Lee, supra note 87, at 1647 
(“With the end of the Cold War, a modern Congress implicitly endorsed the Filartiga interpretation of the ATS by 
enacting the Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991.”). 
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Senate reports’ discussion of the FSIA.96 At the time the TVPA was enacted, foreign 
official immunity was sometimes confused with foreign sovereign immunity.97 Ever 
since 1976, the FSIA provided foreign sovereigns with freedom from suit in U.S. 
courts—and Congress did not intend for the TVPA to change that state-specific 
protection.98 Congress, however, also understood that foreign individuals were 
sometimes entitled to immunity—but in 1991, the source and availability of that 
protection was unclear.99 In 2010, eighteen years after the TVPA’s enactment, the 
confusion over the source of foreign official immunity was resolved with Samantar 
v. Yousuf,100 when the Supreme Court held the FSIA did not apply to foreign 
officials.101 
Fortunately, the House and Senate TVPA reports demonstrate that when 
Congress passed the TVPA, Congress viewed foreign official immunity differently 
than foreign sovereign immunity and expressly intended for foreign officials to be 
liable under the new Act—and thus, not entitled to FSIA immunity—even when the 
official was acting on behalf of a foreign sovereign that was itself entitled to FSIA 
protection.102 The legislative history shows that Congress believed torture and 
extrajudicial killing involved state action of some sort103 and while foreign states 
were immune under the FSIA, the TVPA’s purpose was to create liability for foreign 
individuals.104 Put another way, eighteen years before the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Samantar, Congress had already decided that TVPA defendants were not 
entitled to FSIA immunity.105 
The most compelling evidence of this Congressional understanding is what the 
House and Senate omitted from the legislative history. The year before the TVPA 
was enacted, the Ninth Circuit issued its landmark decision, Chuidian v. Philippine 
National Bank,106 holding that foreign officials were “agencies or instrumentalities” 
of a foreign sovereign and thus entitled to immunity under the FSIA.107 Remarkably, 
neither congressional report mentions Chuidian, nor endorses the applicability of the 
 ________________________  
 96. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8; FSIA, supra note 7. 
 97. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 312–13 (2010) (discussing the history of foreign sovereign 
immunity); Keitner, The Forgotten History, supra note 11, at 705–07. 
 98. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. 
 99. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095,1099–1103 (9th Cir. 1990) abrogated by 
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 310 n.3, 312–13.  
 100. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 325–26. 
 102. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8; TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 103. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (“Despite universal condemnation of these abuses, many of the 
world’s governments still engage in or tolerate torture of their citizens, and state authorities have killed hundreds of 
thousands of people in recent years.”); SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (“Despite universal condemnation of 
these abuses, many of the world’s governments still engage in or tolerate torture of their citizens, and state authorities 
have employed extrajudicial killings to execute many people.”). 
 104. See TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 105. The TVPA became public law in 1992, eighteen years before the Samantar court held that foreign 
sovereign immunity and foreign official immunity were two distinct principles, and a foreign official could not claim 
immunity under the FSIA. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325. Congress’ explanation of the TVPA in the House and Senate 
Reports indicate that this was the intended result of the Act. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4; SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 1–5. 
 106. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S. at 
325–26. 
 107. Id. at 1102. 
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FSIA to foreign officials—with good reason, because when Chuidian was decided, 
the State Department openly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s decision,108 and twenty 
years later, the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, abrogating Chuidian’s holding 
with Samantar.109 
C. “Any Individual” 
The third indication that Congress viewed foreign official immunity differently 
than FSIA sovereign immunity is provided in the text of the House and Senate 
reports, which repeatedly state that liability under the TVPA applies to “any 
individual.”110 The reports argue against conduct-based foreign official immunity by 
carving out an exception for status-based immunity and omitting an exception for 
conduct-based immunity.111 Acknowledging that “[p]ursuant to the FSIA, ‘a foreign 
state,’ or an ‘agency or instrumentality’ thereof, shall be immune from the 
jurisdiction of the courts,” the House Report declares that “sovereign immunity 
would not generally be an available defense”112—clearly the case where the FSIA 
was not applicable to individuals—and TVPA defendants would not be able to avoid 
liability by claiming that the tortious conduct was a sovereign act.113 
The Senate Report also discusses the FSIA,114 and initially seems to confuse the 
issue by stating, “To avoid liability by invoking the FSIA, a former official would 
have to prove an agency relationship to a state, which would require that the state 
‘admit some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).”115 
At first glance, this might demonstrate support for the sort of conduct-based 
immunity that the Dogan court granted, but the languge “admit some knowledge or 
authorization of relevant acts” is actually an incorrect quotation of the FSIA 
 ________________________  
 108. See id. (“[W]e disagree with the government that the Act can reasonably be interpreted to leave intact 
the pre-1976 common law with respect to foreign officials.”). In the years after Chuidian, the executive branch 
consistently rejected the FSIA’s application to individuals. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Affirmance at 6–8, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 2010 WL 342031, at *8. 
 109. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325–326.  
 110. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“The purpose of H.R. 2092 is to provide a Federal cause of action 
against any individual . . .”), 4 (“The legislation authorizes the Federal courts to hear cases brought by or on behalf 
of a victim of any individual . . .”), 7 (“The bill makes any person . . .”); SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (“The 
purpose of this legislation is to provide a Federal cause of action against any individual . . .”), 6 (“The legislation 
authorizes courts in the United States to hear cases brought by or on behalf of a victim of any individual . . .”), 11 
(“The bill makes any person . . .”). 
 111. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (“While sovereign immunity would not generally be an available 
defense, nothing in the TVPA overrides the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity. These doctrines 
would generally provide a defense to suits against foreign heads of state and other diplomats visiting the United 
States on official business.”). The Senate Report also discusses the non-abrogation of status-based immunities and 
omits including conduct-based immunities. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8. See generally Kietner, The 
Common Law, supra note 41, at 62–68, for a discussion of the distinction between conduct-based and status-based 
immunities. 
 112. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 113. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. 
 114. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he TVPA is not meant to override the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, which renders foreign governments immune from suits in U.S. courts.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 115. Id. at 8 (incorrectly citing the FSIA (28 U.S.C. § 1603(b))); cf FSIA, supra note 7, at § 1603(b) (absence 
of quoted language). 
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(specifically, § 1603(b)) .116 The FSIA did not—and to this day does not—contain 
such an avenue to immunity.117 The drafters of this passage in the Senate Report 
appear to have mistakenly lifted the text from an article discussing the post-Filartiga 
ATS that was published in the Harvard International Law Journal in 1981.118 
In that article, Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt identified three abstention 
doctrines foreign individual-defendants could use to dismiss cases arising under the 
post-Filartiga ATS.119 The authors argued that forum non conveniens, FSIA 
sovereign immunity, and the act of state doctrine were possible defenses, but “none 
is automatically fatal to claims [such as torture or summary execution which were] 
involved in Filartiga.”120 Forum non conveniens is not an issue in TVPA actions 
because the Act only provides a cause of action in U.S. courts once the plaintiff has 
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the most convenient forum: “the place 
in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”121 As to the act of state 
doctrine, the Senate Report explicitly rejected that common law doctrine as an 
available source of individual immunity.122 
While FSIA sovereign immunity was not as clearly rejected as the act of state 
doctrine or forum non conveniens, examining the Blum and Steinhardt article—
which the Senate Report appears to have relied upon—provides additional support 
for congressional intent.123 Ten years before Congress enacted the TVPA, Blum and 
Steinhardt suggested that courts look to principles of liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
actions for help determining foreign official liability in ATS cases.124 Notably, both 
House and Senate Reports also instruct courts to look to immunities available in § 
1983 actions for guidance when determining the liability of foreign officials in 
TVPA actions.125 As Blum and Steinhardt suggested for the ATS—and Congress 
 ________________________  
 116. FSIA, supra note 7, at § 1603(b).  
 117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988). When the TVPA was enacted in 1991, the 1988 edition of the U.S. Code 
was the most current edition of the FSIA. The FSIA has never included the “admit some knowledge or authorization 
of relevant acts” language. If a claim made was against a sovereign, the sovereign was immune—regardless of the 
sovereign’s knowledge or authorization. See FSIA, supra note 7. Knowledge or authorization is only a factor when 
an individual is seeking conduct-based immunity; but when the FSIA was enacted, individuals were not supposed 
to be protected by the Act. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010). 
 118. Compare Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights 
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 53, 106–07 (1981) (arguing 
that the “agency or instrumentality” language in the FSIA should be interpreted to “require that the defendants prove 
an agency relationship to the state, which would need in turn to admit some knowledge or authorization of the 
relevant acts.” (emphasis added)), with SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7 (“To avoid liability by invoking the 
FSIA, a former official would have to prove an agency relationship to a state, which would require that the state 
‘admit some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts.’” (emphasis added)). 
 119. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 118, at 103–08. 
 120. Id. at 103. 
 121. TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(b). 
 122. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (“[T]he committee does not intend the ‘act of state’ doctrine to 
provide a shield from lawsuit for former officials.”).  
 123. Compare Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 118, at 107, with SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7. 
 124. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 118, at 107 (“There is no indication in the legislative history of the FSIA 
that individuals would be entitled to sovereign immunity, and a clear analogy is available to the domestic context, 
where courts are familiar with the statutory and constitutional analysis by which state officials may be held civilly 
liable for wrongs committed within the scope of their employment or under color of state law.”) (footnote omitted) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83 and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
 125. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
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later suggested for the TVPA—the ATS and TVPA statutes modify the foreign 
official immunity doctrine by allowing (as § 1983 allows126) government officials to 
be held personally liable for tortious conduct undertaken in an official capacity.127 
Put another way, the ATS and TVPA change conduct-based foreign official 
immunity from an absolute immunity (automatically available when the official acts 
in an official capacity) to a qualified immunity (not automatically available).128 
This makes congressional silence regarding Chuidian notable for another reason: 
If Congress agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FSIA or intended 
for TVPA defendants to be able to invoke the FSIA’s “agency or instrumentality” 
immunity, there would be no need for both reports’ discussion of status-based 
immunities or immunities available in § 1983 actions.129 The fact that both the House 
and Senate specifically addressed each,130 combined with the fact that neither report 
endorses or even mentions Chuidian, demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
foreign officials to be entitled to absolute or automatic immunity merely because the 
officials acted on behalf of a foreign sovereign or engaged in official conduct. A 
foreign sovereign’s acknowledgement and embracement of a TVPA defendant’s 
conduct has no bearing on the official’s own personal liability for torture or 
extrajudicial killing. 
D. Status-Based and Conduct-Based Federal Common Law Immunity 
The fourth indication that Congress wanted to eliminate traditional conduct-
based foreign official immunity for TVPA defendants is demonstrated by the 
legislative history’s contrasting discussion of an official’s status and an official’s 
conduct as a basis for liability. As discussed above, Congress intended for the TVPA 
to apply to “any individual”131 who commits torture or extrajudicial killing while 
acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law.”132 Both House and 
Senate Reports, however, explicitly state that status-based immunities remain 
unchanged as a source of protection against TVPA liability.133 As to conduct, the 
overall structure and purpose of the TVPA indicates a clear intention to modify 
foreign official immunity in cases of torture and extrajudicial killing by premising 
TVPA liability on an individual’s conduct that must be undertaken in an official (or 
under color of official) capacity.134 For help navigating congressional silence 
 ________________________  
 126. See infra Part III. 
 127. Compare SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8, and HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5, with Blum & 
Steinhardt, supra note 118, at 107 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–83; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
 128. See infra Part IV. 
 129. Compare Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100–03 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
individuals could be an “agency or instrumentality” under the FSIA), with HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 
(indicating that an action may be brought against an individual acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color 
of law,” as in 28 U.S.C. § 1983 actions), and SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8 (using the term “‘individual’ to 
make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only 
individuals may be sued” and drawing analogy to 28 U.S.C. § 1983).  
 130. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4–5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8.  
 131. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 132. TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a). 
 133. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7–8. 
 134. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. 
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regarding conduct-based immunity, Congress is explicit: “Courts should look to 
principles of liability under U.S. civil rights laws, in particular section 1983 of title 
42 of the United States Code.”135  
The Senate Report provides additional evidence that the TVPA changes 
traditional conduct-based immunity by declaring that the scope of TVPA liability 
even extends to foreign officials who have acted fully within the scope of their 
authority or official capacity136—the foundational element necessary for conduct-
based immunity.137 The mere fact that conduct was an official act or was undertaken 
within an official capacity does not shield a defendant from TVPA liability:138 
[A] higher official need not have personally performed or ordered 
the abuses in order to be held liable. Under international law, 
responsibility for torture, summary execution, or disappearances 
extends beyond the person or persons who actually committed those 
acts—anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or 
knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.139 
In the section titled, “Scope of Liability,” the Senate Report cites two cases in 
which foreign officials were acting in their official capacity and within their 
supervisory authority but were nevertheless held liable for the tortious conduct of 
their subordinates.140 In both cases, conduct-based immunity was not granted to 
foreign officials in actions involving allegations of torture or extrajudicial killing.141 
In summary, the legislative history of the TVPA shows that Congress did not 
intend the Act to eliminate FSIA immunity protecting foreign sovereigns and did not 
intend for other foreign organizations to be liable for an official’s tortious conduct.142 
However, requiring “some governmental involvement in the torture or killing” and 
instructing courts to apply § 1983 principles of immunity clearly demonstrates an 
 ________________________  
 135. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (“Courts should look to 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 i[n] construing ‘color of law’ and agency law in construing ‘actual or apparent authority.’”). 
 136. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (“[T]he phrase ‘actual or apparent authority or under color of 
law’ is used to denote torture and extrajudicial killings committed by officials both within and outside the scope of 
their authority.”); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (“The phrase ‘under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law’ makes clear that the plaintiff must establish some governmental involvement in the torture or killing 
to prove a claim.”). 
 137. See supra Part I. 
 138. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 139. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9 & 9 n.16 (citing with approval Organization of American States, 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art 3, Dec. 9, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521, O.A.S.T.S. No. 
67 (“The following shall be held guilty of the crime of torture: (a) A public servant or employee who, acting in that 
capacity, orders, instigates or induces the use of torture, or directly commits it or who, being able to prevent it, fails 
to do so.”)).  
 140. Id. at 9 (discussing Forti v. Suarez Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding Argentinian 
general liable for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed by officers under his command) and In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding Japanese general liable for war crimes committed by officers under his 
command)). 
 141. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.  
 142. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Israel, 235 F. Supp. 3d 249, 261–62 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding the State of Israel 
and its ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Public Security were immune in an action involving the 
same events as Dogan); Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 456 (2012) (holding the TVPA did not apply 
to a non-sovereign organization because Congress only intended for natural persons to be liable). 
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intent to eliminate traditional conduct-based immunity and allow foreign officials to 
be held liable under the new Act.143 
III. IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ACTIONS 
The fifth and most significant indication that Congress intended for the TVPA 
to change traditional federal common law foreign official immunity is demonstrated 
by the House and Senate Reports’ instruction that courts should look to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 when determining a TVPA defendant’s scope of liability for torture or 
extrajudicial killing.144 Section 1983 is a powerful civil rights statute that grants 
private-party plaintiffs the authority to bring civil actions against U.S. state and local 
government officials accused of violating federal law.145 The Statute is remarkable 
because of the way it enables private individuals to enforce federally protected rights 
against state and local governments—even though the Eleventh Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution entitles states to immunity in federal courts.146 Section 1983 
protects victims of tortious state action by providing them with a cause of action 
against the individuals who take the harmful action on behalf of the state or local 
government entity.147 As a result, government officials may be held personally liable 
for their official acts—even Category One acts148—which violate the U.S. 
Constitution or federal law, despite the fact that the state itself could not be haled 
into court for the same violation.149 
Section 1983 liability, however, is not unlimited.150 Government officials sued 
under § 1983 can sometimes assert “absolute immunity” or “qualified immunity” 
depending on the plaintiff’s type of claim.151 Absolute immunity—which is closely 
related to status-based immunity152—is only available to defendants in unique 
positions, such as judges, prosecutors, witnesses, or legislators.153 Qualified 
immunity—which is closely related to conduct-based immunity154—is available to 
 ________________________  
 143. See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
 144. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. 
 145. See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 3d ed. 2014). 
Federal officials are not subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but may be sued in their personal capacity for 
official acts under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); cf. Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 
2066 (2014) (stating Bivens “recognized an implied right of action against federal officers”); Minneci v. Pollard, 
565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (arguing the same). 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 12. 
 148. See supra Part I. 
 149. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 12; see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012); Ex parte 
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). 
 150. See Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 361 (“Despite the broad terms of § 1983, [the Supreme] Court has long 
recognized that the statute was not meant to effect a radical departure from ordinary tort law and the common-law 
immunities applicable in tort suits.”). 
 151. See id.; see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (“[I]n determining immunity, we examine 
‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” (quoting Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988))). 
 152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 153. SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 128. 
 154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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any government official but only “so long as the official did not violate clearly 
established federal law.”155 
Viewing immunity in a TVPA action as Congress instructed leads to a 
remarkable result. Applying § 1983 immunities to the TVPA, foreign judges, 
prosecutors, witnesses, and legislators accused of committing torture or extrajudicial 
killing could be entitled to immunity, but only when the torture or extrajudicial 
killing was a judicial, prosecutorial, testimonial, or legislative act156—namely, clear 
Category One conduct.157 For example, applying § 1983 to a judge who orders torture 
or extrajudicial killing could result in immunity if the order “is one normally 
performed by a judge.”158 Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for all judicial 
acts and “will not be deprived of immunity because the action [the judge] took was 
in error . . . or was in excess of his authority.”159 Section 1983 absolute immunity—
remarkably similar to status-based foreign official immunity—functions the same 
way for prosecutors,160 witnesses,161 and legislators.162 If TVPA immunities are 
interpreted as Congress intended, foreign officials acting in a judicial, prosecutorial, 
testimonial, or legislative capacity would be entitled to absolute or status-based 
immunity against allegations of torture or extrajudicial killing where the torture or 
extrajudicial killing was a judicial, prosecutorial, testimonial, or legislative act. 
Setting aside the rare instances in which absolute or status-based immunity may 
be available (for example if a judge or prosecutor orders an individual to be tortured), 
foreign officials in TVPA actions will usually only be able to seek qualified 
immunity because “no state commits torture as a matter of public policy.”163 “[W]hen 
qualified [or conduct-based] immunity is asserted as a defense, the critical issue is 
whether the defendant-official violated federal law that was clearly established at the 
time she acted.”164 In TVPA cases, the conduct the foreign official seeks to protect 
is the conduct that the plaintiff alleges constitutes torture or extrajudicial killing. In 
a domestic § 1983 action, if an allegation of torture or extrajudicial killing is 
plausibly165 made, the § 1983 defendant-official would not be entitled to qualified 
immunity because acts that constitute torture or extrajudicial killing are a violation 
 ________________________  
 155. SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 143. 
 156. See id. at 128–42 (discussing § 1983 absolute immunity). 
 157. See supra Part I. Category One conduct would be entitled to immunity under the FSIA. See id. 
 158. SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 130. In this example, a foreign judge who sentences an individual to 
imprisonment in a labor camp would be immune from allegations of ordering torture if the sentence was normally 
imposed by a judge in the foreign state. 
 159. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)). 
 160. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 132–39; see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 345 (2009) 
(holding prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when engaging in conduct that is intimately associated with 
the judicial phase of the criminal process). 
 161. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 139–41; see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332–33 (1983) 
(holding witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity against the effects of their testimony—even when the witness 
commits perjury). 
 162. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 141–42; see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) 
(holding legislators are entitled to absolute immunity for legislative acts). 
 163. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
 164. SCHWARTZ, supra note 145, at 143 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 165. Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, plaintiffs are required to allege a “plausible” claim that the foreign official’s 
conduct (if proven true) constitutes torture or extrajudicial killing as defined by the TVPA. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 
TVPA, supra note 3, at § 3. 
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of clearly established federal law.166 Imputing that same analysis to the TVPA, if an 
allegation of torture or extrajudicial killing by the foreign official is plausibly made 
in a TVPA action, that foreign official is not entitled to qualified or conduct-based 
immunity because torture and extrajudicial killing are violations of clearly 
established federal law—in this case, the TVPA itself. Viewed from the alternate 
vantage of the foreign official’s state’s law, a TVPA defendant would also not be 
entitled to immunity if torture and extrajudicial killing are prohibited the foreign 
state’s own clearly established law. 
IV. CONDUCT-BASED IMMUNITY DOES NOT PROTECT TVPA DEFENDANTS 
Unlike the Eleventh Amendment—which provides U.S. states with a 
constitutional immunity from suit in federal courts167—Congress has the authority to 
abrogate the scope of immunity available to foreign sovereigns because the source 
of foreign sovereign immunity is statutory and common law-based, not 
constitutional.168 In addition, as the continued enforcement of § 1983 
demonstrates,169 Congress also has the authority to enact statutes that abrogate the 
scope of immunity available to government officials sued in their personal capacity 
for actions undertaken in their official capacity.170 Foreign officials who are sued in 
U.S. courts in their personal capacity for money damages payable from the foreign 
officials’ own pockets are only entitled to immunity (if at all) under federal common 
law—there is no statutory or constitutional source the official can invoke for 
protection.171 
Federal common law recognizes two forms of foreign official immunity: status-
based (which is similar to § 1983 absolute immunity) and conduct-based (which is 
similar to § 1983 qualified immunity).172 The TVPA does not change traditional 
status-based foreign official immunity.173 The Act did, however, dramatically alter 
federal common law conduct-based immunity for allegations of torture or 
extrajudicial killing.174 TVPA defendants cannot be granted conduct-based 
 ________________________  
 166. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 
130, 136 (1878) (“[P]unishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden 
by [the Eighth Amendment] to the Constitution.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2012) (“Whoever outside the United 
States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”). 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 168. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (“Congress has the undisputed 
power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what circumstances foreign nations should be 
amenable to suit in the United States.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–31 (1991) (holding government officials may be liable in their 
personal capacities, even though the tortious conduct relates to their official actions). 
 170. See supra Part III; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (“Congress clearly has authority to create 
a private right of action for torture and extrajudicial killings committed abroad.”). 
 171. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010) (“[T]his case, in which respondents have sued petitioner 
in his personal capacity and seek damages from his own pockets, is properly governed by the common law . . . .”). 
 172. See, e.g., NANDA ET AL., supra note 41, at § 4:1; Keitner, The Common Law, supra note 41, at 63. 
 173. See, e.g., Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 179–80 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding the TVPA did not 
abrogate status-based foreign official immunity); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra Part II. 
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immunity when accused of torture or extrajudicial killing because to be liable under 
the TVPA the defendant must be engaged in official or seemingly official conduct—
the very foundation that would have entitled the defendant to immunity under the 
traditional federal common law doctrine.175 
Consistent with § 1983 actions and congressional intent, conduct-based 
immunity in TVPA actions is most appropriately viewed as a “[q]ualified immunity 
[which] balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials 
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials 
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”176 Because “[o]fficial torture and summary execution violate standards 
accepted by virtually every nation,”177 foreign officials who perform such acts cannot 
perform their duties reasonably and should not be protected from TVPA liability. A 
federal common law doctrine cannot deprive TVPA plaintiffs of their rights because 
the TVPA is a “controlling legislative act” that overrides—and essentially 
eliminates—conduct-based foreign official immunity for allegations of torture or 
extrajudicial killing.178 
Viewed through Professor Keitner’s category framework,179 the TVPA has 
altered the legal playing field by ensuring Category Three personal liability for 
torture and extrajudicial killing—even though such acts were traditionally Category 
Two.180 While the TVPA does not expressly eliminate attribution or a foreign 
sovereign’s liability for torture or extrajudicial killing, the inclusion of such language 
is not necessary to ensure foreign individuals are subject to suit. When the TVPA 
was enacted, foreign sovereigns were already immune in civil actions alleging 
torture or extrajudicial killing.181 Moreover, Congress did not believe torture or 
extrajudicial killing could be attributable to a foreign sovereign in the first place.182 
If foreign states cannot take legal responsibility for acts of torture or extrajudicial 
killing, there is no underlying immunity blanket with which foreign officials can 
wrap themselves for their own personal or conduct-based protection. 
Final support in favor of a broad reading of conduct-based TVPA liability is 
provided by the ATS.183 When Congress enacted the TVPA and linked it with the 
post-Filartiga ATS, foreign officials were not immune against allegations of torture 
or extrajudicial killing—even though the official acted in an official capacity.184 
 ________________________  
 175. See TVPA, supra note 3, at § 2(a) (stating defendants must have acted “under actual or apparent authority, 
or color of law”). 
 176. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (discussing government official immunity in § 1983 
actions). 
 177. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. 
 178. See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 36, at 266. 
 179. See Keitner, Categorizing Acts, supra note 45, at 453–54; supra Part I. 
 180. See supra Part II. C. 
 181. See supra Part II. B. 
 182. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“Official torture and summary execution violate standards accepted 
by virtually every nation.”); SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (“[N]o state commits torture as a matter of public 
policy.”). 
 183. See supra Part II. A. 
 184. See Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889–90 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Paraguay’s renunciation of torture as 
a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does not strip the tort of its character as an international law 
violation, if it in fact occurred under color of government authority.” (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908))). 
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Unlike the ATS, which is only a subject matter jurisdictional statute giving federal 
courts authority to hear cases involving foreign plaintiffs and defendants,185 the 
TVPA is a rights-creating statute that gives U.S. citizens a cause of action against 
current and former foreign government officials.186 As a result, the TVPA is 
unaffected by the Supreme Court’s recent narrowing of the ATS to “claims [that 
must] touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force 
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”187 Although the two 
statutes are codified in the same part of the U.S. Code, judicially imposed 
jurisdictional limitations on the ATS do not impact the TVPA. Federal courts have 
jurisdiction over TVPA claims because the TVPA is a federal statute and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 provides federal subject matter jurisdiction.188 If policymakers and legal 
experts believe subjecting foreign individuals to liability in U.S. courts should be 
minimized (as appears, in part, to have justified the Supreme Court’s recent 
limitation of the ATS189), Congress is the only body with authority to change the text 
of the TVPA statute.190 
Traditional conduct-based immunity analysis boils down to assigning blame: 
Either the official is liable for his or her conduct because the sovereign is unwilling 
or unable to take responsibility, or the sovereign is liable because the conduct 
constitutes an act of the state.191 The TVPA changes that bedrock immunity analysis 
by expanding the scope of individual liability for acts of torture or extrajudicial 
killing.192 Now, the foreign official acting in an official capacity is wholly liable for 
torture or extrajudicial killing, even when the sovereign is willing to take 
responsibility or the tortious acts constitute acts of state. Under the TVPA, the 
analysis is no longer either-or. 
 ________________________  
 185. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Pamela J. 
Stephens, Beyond Torture: Enforcing International Human Rights in Federal Courts, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 941, 
975 (2001); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Though the Torture Victim Act creates a cause of 
action for official torture, this statute, unlike the Alien Tort Act, is not itself a jurisdictional statute. The Torture 
Victim Act permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the jurisdiction conferred by the 
Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal question jurisdiction of [28 U.S.C. §] 1331.”); Singh v. G.k., No. 
1:15-CV-05372 (ALC), 2016 WL 3181149, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016). 
 186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“The purpose of [the TVPA] is to provide a Federal cause of 
action against any individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation, subjects 
any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.”); SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; see also Lee, supra note 87, 
at 1647–48. 
 187. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power 
shall extend to all Cases . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”); see 
also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
 189. See Lee, supra note 87, at 1648 (“The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. marks an attempt to end the cosmopolitan second life of the ATS launched by Filartiga.”). 
 190. See Ryan, supra note 38, at 1797–99, 1805–09 (recommending a new federal statute to codify federal 
common law foreign official immunity similar to the FSIA’s codification of foreign sovereign immunity). 
 191. See supra Part I. 
 192. See supra Part II. C; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. 
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V. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH CANNOT UNILATERALLY GRANT IMMUNITY 
Because the TVPA permits foreign officials acting in an official capacity to be 
sued for money damages payable from their own pockets, the Dogan v. Barak193 
decision granting immunity to the defendant should be reversed. Before issuing that 
order, however, the Ninth Circuit must consider two final complications: required 
party joinder and whether the executive branch may unilaterally grant immunity to 
a foreign official. 
The first complication, which is created by any statute that authorizes action 
against government officials (such as the TVPA or § 1983), involves required party 
joinder. As the Supreme Court noted in Samantar: 
Even when a plaintiff names only a foreign official, it may be the 
case that the foreign state itself, its political subdivision, or an 
agency or instrumentality is a required party, because that party has 
“an interest relating to the subject of the action” and “disposing of 
the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter 
impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” FED. 
RULE CIV. PROC. 19(a)(1)(B). If this is the case, and the entity is 
immune from suit under the FSIA, the district court may have to 
dismiss the suit, regardless of whether the official is immune or not 
under the common law.194 
Section 1983 suits against state officials, and Bivens actions against federal 
officials,195 demonstrate that the sovereign is not a required party in civil actions 
against officials who are sued in their personal capacity.196 Rule 19 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure197 does not compel courts to dismiss actions against foreign 
or domestic government officials where the plaintiffs seek money damages only 
from the officials and do not pursue judicial action against the sovereign.198 
Moreover, required party joinder may not even be an issue in the Dogan appeal 
because the Dogan court did not justify dismissal on such grounds.199 Nevertheless, 
if required party joinder is raised at the Ninth Circuit or at the district court on 
remand, the argument should fail because: (1) the TVPA creates a situation where 
 ________________________  
 193. Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016) 
on appeal No. 16-56704 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016). 
 194. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324–25 (2010) (citing Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 
851, 867 (2008)). 
 195. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 399 (1971) (holding individuals may bring 
civil lawsuits against federal government officials for violations of constitutionally protected rights). 
 196. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (holding plaintiffs can sustain civil actions against 
individual officials even though the government is immune and not able to be joined). 
 197. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
 198. See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653, 665–666 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d, 811 F.3d 653 (4th Cir. 
2016); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 122 F. Supp. 3d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Yousuf v. Samantar, 
No. 1:04-cv-01360 (LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 7445583 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011), aff’d, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 199. Dogan v. Barak, No. 2:15-cv-08130-ODW(GSJx), 2016 WL 6024416, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016) 
on appeal No. 16-56704 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016). 
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foreign officials can be held liable independent of the foreign state (therefore, the 
sovereign is not required for the action against the official to proceed); and (2) states 
do not have a legitimate protectable interest in conduct that constitutes torture or 
extrajudicial killing (and thus, the sovereign does not have an interest that can be 
impaired or impeded).200 
The second complication the Ninth Circuit will have to address—which was on 
the Dogan court’s mind201 and which is not analogous to § 1983 actions involving 
domestic government officials—involves the competing constitutional powers of the 
executive and judicial branches in the context of foreign affairs. After both the 
defendant and plaintiff submitted their briefs supporting and opposing Barak’s 
motion to dismiss, the executive branch filed a fifteen-page “Suggestion of 
Immunity” that essentially ordered the court to grant conduct-based immunity to 
Barak and dismiss the plaintiff’s case.202 The Dogan court avoided deciding whether 
the executive branch has the authority to require such judicial action by holding that: 
the TVPA permitted federal common law conduct-based immunity and the court 
itself was granting immunity independent of the mandate by the executive branch.203 
When the Ninth Circuit reverses that interpretation of the TVPA, however, it will be 
forced to choose sides in a split between the Second and Fourth Circuits over the 
amount of deference courts must give to executive branch determinations of 
immunity.204 
The Ninth Circuit has not established whether executive branch determinations 
of conduct-based foreign official immunity are binding, but the arguments put forth 
by the executive branch in favor of mandatory deference are fatally flawed.205 First, 
the executive branch relies on two Supreme Court decisions from the early 1940s to 
argue that “the State Department’s determination regarding immunity is, and long 
has been, binding in judicial proceedings.”206 While the two cases, Republic of 
 ________________________  
 200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (“Official torture and summary execution 
violate standards accepted by virtually every nation.”); SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (“[N]o state commits 
torture as a matter of public policy.”). 
 201. Transcript of Motion to Dismiss Proceedings, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 202. See Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 2, at 2 (“The Department of State has made the 
determination, to which the Court must defer, that Barak is immune from suit under the common law.”). 
 203. Dogan, 2016 WL 6024416, at *12.  
 204. Compare Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661–62 (4th Cir. 2016), and Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 
773, 777 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The State Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by contrast, is 
not controlling” and “officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign official immunity for [international 
law] violations.”), with Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2014) (“‘[I]n the common-law context, 
we defer to the Executive’s determination of the scope of immunity’ and ‘[a] claim premised on the violation of 
[international law] does not withstand foreign [official] immunity.’” (quoting Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d 
Cir. 2009))). 
 205. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the executive branch filed an amicus brief again arguing that “courts are 
required to defer to the Executive Branch’s suggestion of immunity on behalf of a foreign official named as a 
defendant in a civil suit in the United States.” Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance at 2, Dogan v. Barak, No. 16-56704 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016), ECF No. 41 [hereinafter Dogan Brief for 
the United States]. The Executive has made the same argument in previous briefs. See, e.g., Samantar Brief for the 
United States, supra note 15, at 13–20; Dogan Suggestion of Immunity, supra note 2, at 2, 9–10; Rosenberg v. 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, 980 F. Supp. 2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 10-CV-05381 (DLI)), ECF No. 35 (“[I]t is for the 
Executive Branch, not the courts, to determine whether the conduct alleged was taken in a foreign official’s official 
capacity.”). 
 206. Dogan Brief for the United States, supra note 205, at 12–14. 
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Mexico v. Hoffman207 and Ex parte Republic of Peru,208 did support absolute 
deference to the executive branch, the decisions were made under a vastly different 
legal framework than exists today and are no longer relevant.209 Up until the early 
1950s (well after Hoffman and Ex parte Peru were decided), foreign sovereigns were 
entitled to absolute immunity.  That all changed, however, with the adoption of the 
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in the 1952 Tate Letter210 and 
enactment of the FSIA in 1976.211 Under the now-outdated absolute immunity legal 
framework, courts were required to defer to the executive branch because immunity 
was essentially a product of the executive branch’s exclusive authority to recognize 
foreign sovereigns.212 When the State Department adopted the restrictive theory in 
the Tate Letter and the Executive later supported its codification under the FSIA, the 
executive branch waived the sort of absolute control Hoffman and Ex parte Peru 
allowed and the Executive currently advocates. 
In 1970, the Supreme Court confronted a similar question about the appropriate 
relationship between federal common law and changes to federal statutory law.213 In 
that case, the Court’s unanimous “opinion noted that whatever the correctness of [the 
prior common law based judgment (such as Hoffman or Ex parte Peru)] at the time 
of its decision, legislative developments had changed the legal background against 
which the Court must assess the common law.”214 “It has always been the duty of the 
common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to 
interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law 
principles.”215 
The second flaw with the argument in favor of mandatory deference is that 
ordering courts to defer to executive branch determinations of immunity exceeds the 
scope of the executive branch’s authority.216 Federal common law foreign official 
immunity flows directly out of foreign sovereign immunity.217 In 1976, Congress 
 ________________________  
 207. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“It is therefore not for the courts to deny an 
immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the 
government has not seen fit to recognize.”). 
 208. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (“The certification and the request that the vessel 
be declared immune must be accepted by the courts. . .”). 
 209. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 692–94 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing the relationship 
of federal statutory and common law); see also Wuerth, supra note 10, at 924 (arguing “that the Court’s cursory 
reasoning in Ex parte Peru and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman is unconvincing in the light of the text and structure 
of the Constitution”). 
 210. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., 
Dep’t of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (1952). 
 211. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 10, at 1142–46 (discussing the history of foreign sovereign immunity); Ryan, 
supra note 38, at 1787–94. 
 212. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (affirming the executive branch’s exclusive 
authority to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign). 
 213. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 209, 
at 692–94. 
 214. FALLON ET AL., supra note 209, at 692–93. 
 215. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 392. 
 216. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J. 
concurring) (dividing executive power into three categories and noting that executive power is at its weakest when 
“the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress”). 
 217. See supra Part I; supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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enacted the FSIA to codify foreign sovereign immunity and vest the courts with the 
exclusive authority to grant foreign sovereigns the source of the protection that 
foreign officials seek under federal common law.218 If the Executive cannot compel 
courts to grant immunity to foreign sovereigns, why would courts be required to 
defer to executive branch determinations of foreign official immunity, when foreign 
official immunity necessitates the same immunity analysis that the FSIA 
purposefully vested with the judiciary?  
The final argument against mandatory deference is practical. If the executive 
branch is given absolute power to immunize foreign officials, what happens when 
the Executive makes a mistake or adopts an incorrect interpretation of a federal 
statute? Dogan v. Barak should serve as a warning. In this case, the executive branch 
adopted an improper view of the TVPA that will only be reexamined because the 
district court adopted the same interpretation and the plaintiffs were able to appeal 
the decision to the Ninth Circuit. If the executive branch has the power to unilaterally 
grant immunity to a foreign official whenever the President deems it necessary, the 
ability to ensure that federal laws are correctly applied becomes unreviewable. As 
the Ninth Circuit recently declared: 
There is no precedent to support this claimed unreviewability, which 
runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional 
democracy. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) 
(rejecting the idea that, even by congressional statute, Congress and 
the Executive could eliminate federal court habeas jurisdiction over 
enemy combatants, because the “political branches” lack “the power 
to switch the Constitution on or off at will”). Within our system, it 
is the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will 
sometimes require the “[r]esolution of litigation challenging the 
constitutional authority of one of the three branches.”219 
CONCLUSION 
By premising liability on conduct that must be undertaken in an official or under 
color of official capacity, the TVPA eliminated the federal common law of conduct-
based foreign official immunity in civil actions alleging torture or extrajudicial 
killing. As a result, defendant Barak was not entitled to dismissal, and the Ninth 
Circuit cannot uphold the district court’s decision and State Department’s 
interpretation of the TVPA. The Ninth Circuit should also reject absolute deference 
to executive branch determinations of conduct-based foreign official immunity—if 
for no other reason than in this case, the Executive incorrectly interpreted and applied 
a federal statute. The President should not have unilateral and unchecked power to 
 ________________________  
 218. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (“A principle purpose 
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pick winners and losers in civil actions arising under a federal law. That authority—
to apply U.S. law and resolve disputes—must remain vested in the judiciary and 
protected by the appeals process. 
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